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EMERGENT HUMAN BEHAVIOUR DURING A DISASTER:
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Abstract. Disasters or catastrophes engender social and spatial
disorganization of the territories affected by these events and spe-
cific human behaviour. In this paper, we look both at the responses
of societies in terms of specific human behaviour in times of disas-
ter or catastrophe, which may be either a form of vulnerability or
on the contrary of social resilience, and at the forms of emergence
associated with such exceptional events. The first part proposes a
typology of behaviours observed at times of catastrophe and identi-
fies properties common to all such behaviours. Parts two and three
ask whether behaviours observed at times of disaster or catastrophe
(behaviours that stand apart from everyday behaviours and that
can be observed both individually and collectively) can be charac-
terized as emergent behaviours. Answering this involves weighing
up inputs from the science of risk and the science of complexity. We
present the different properties for characterizing emergent human
behaviour, in order to recombine the disciplinary approach of scien-
tific communities. This knowledge of the conditions underlying the
emergence of behaviours points the way to how the phenomenon
might be modelled.
Keywords. Human behaviour, emergent group, global behaviour,
catastrophe, disaster, complex system, emergence, qualitative
change.
1 Introduction
Disasters or catastrophes engender social and spatial dis-
organization of the territories affected by these events.
Such disorganization is usually temporary and seldom ir-
reversible. Fritz (1961) lists four main properties char-
acterizing catastrophes or disasters: (a) events that are
identified in space and time (date, frequency and dura-
tion) (b) that have impacts, (c) on social units, (d) which
in return come up with responses or adjustments to those
impacts. Fritz thus makes connections between the event,
the impacts and the responses to those impacts. The so-
cial unit is variable in scale as it encompasses individuals,
families, groups, institutions or the entire society. Lares
(1992) enhances this concept of disaster by integrating
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the idea of individual and group behaviour, which are
an atypical, immediate and contextualized response to
the event: ’El desastre o la emergencia masiva se puede
definir come un peligro que se fue mas alla y que incide
en la conducta individual y de grupos, ya que los diversos
sectores de la poblacion deben dejar de lado sus meta indi-
viduales et sociales que configuran su marco de referencia,
y formular de manera inmediatamente nuevas metas que
deben ser resueltas aqui y ahora ’1.
In this paper, we look both at the responses of societies
in terms of specific human behaviour in times of disaster
or catastrophe, which may be either a form of vulnerabil-
ity or on the contrary of social resilience, and at the forms
of emergence associated with such exceptional events.
This research postulates that a large majority of soci-
eties, no matter their level of economic development, are
unprepared to face man-made or natural disasters and
domino effects. Paradoxically, the Japan, which is among
the most advanced countries in terms of risk culture, has
just suffered a chain of events that led to one of the most
severe catastrophe that has ever occurred. Despite this
exceptional event, recent years have been characterized
by the multiplication of major catastrophic phenomena.
This tendency is not likely to reverse in the futur be-
cause of population growth and the densification of infras-
tructures and population in high risk areas. If the trend
continues, thousands of human lives will be lost and the
costs of disasters should exceed USD 300 billion a year
(Groupe URD-Urgence, re´habilitation, de´veloppement-,
2010). Moreover, as stated by Lagadec ’shocks are be-
coming very rapidly sytemic, they are evolving quickly
from the local level to the national and the international
ones’ as it has been demonstrated by the eruption of the
Eyjafjallajo¨kull volcano in 2010 (Iceland) which caused
air traffic disruption in our globalized world, or by the
dissemination of an avian influenza virus (H5N1virus) in
2004. Some organizations are now using the devastat-
ing natural catastrophe term to describe an event were
1The massive disaster or emergency can be defined as a dan-
ger that went beyond and that affects the individual and group
behaviour because the various sectors of the population must put
aside their individual and social goals that form their framework
and they must immediately formulate new goals so that must be
resolved ”here and now”
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the number of fatalities exceeds 500 and/or overall loss
exceeds USD 650 millions. (Munich Re, 2011). More-
over, great natural catastrophe term is now used if a re-
gions ability to help itself is distinctly overtaxed, making
supraregional or international assistance necessary. As
a rule, this is the case when there are thousands of fa-
talities, hundreds of thousands are left homeless and/or
the overall or insured losses are of exceptional propor-
tions given the economic circumstances of the country
concerned. (Munich Re, 2011 on the basis of the United
Nations definition).
Our societies have to enhance the culture of risk, in
order to save human lives but also because the costs of
disasters are increasing. The insurance and reinsurance
scheme can no longer cover those costs if the increase
of ”greats” natural or man-made catastrophes observed
since early 2010 continues. For example, if a great earth-
quake, like the one which hit San Francisco in 1906 strikes
again in the same region, the number of fatalities would be
comparable to what it was in 1906 (due to the growth of
population) despite improvements in building codes and
construction practices, and the forecast property loss to
buildings would be in the range of approximately USD
90 to USD 120 billion (Kircher et al. 2006). Moreover,
state governments which until now have always under-
taken measures to support financial damage above a cer-
tain threshold are actually facing colossal budget deficits
(Le Monde, 2011). The challenge is particularly complex
in densely populated societies and/or in areas, as in Eu-
rope, that have a rich and varied heritage and that have
been relatively safeguarded from a great or a devastat-
ing catastrophe.
Three levels can be used to reduce the vulnerability of
territorial systems : planning policies, civil engineering
and awareness raising, education and training for disas-
ters situations. If, this last level is applied in societies
that regulary are facing to particular types of hazards
(earthquakes, hurricanes, floods), it remains marginally
considered in societies where hazards frequency is low.
More generally, research related to disasters focus on haz-
ard and its mode of diffusion at detailed levels to improve
planning policies and civil engineering. Recent develop-
ments in computer science and the evolution of comput-
ing power permit to make complex simulations. However,
human behaviours modelling is less studied. Yet, this as-
pect also influences damages and thus their costs all the
more when human behaviours are unadapted.
Modelling human behaviours suppose beforehand to
identify observed behaviours during catastrophes, their
frequency, conditions in which they appear and their ef-
fects. It is a necessary precondition to produce simula-
tions as close as possible to reality.
But most often the analysis of human behaviour in dis-
aster situations cover a specific event (many events were
described and analyzed by the Disaster Research Center,
the Center for the Study of Disasters, or by other authors
as Mileti, 1993, Bourque and Russel 1994, who worked
on the analysis of behaviours during the 1989 Loma Pri-
eta earthquake ; Ripley, 2008 on the World Trade Center
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; Morin and al.,
2009 on the 2005 volcanic eruption of mount Karthala;
Ruin, 2010, on the 2002 flood in the French department
of Gard) or even more specifically on a specific behaviour,
such as looting or panic (Dupuy, 1991; Quarantelli, 1994a
; Provitolo, 2003; Barsky et al. 2006; Hagenauer et al.,
2011).
Analysis on the diversity of behaviours during domino
effect are also limited. In addition, the results are gen-
erally based on surveys carried out before and/or after a
disaster. But the analysis based on different surveys do
not always allow a generalization of the results because
samples are either too small or not representative of the
population (Dauphine´, 2003) or even not reproducible.
From the behaviours observed during a specific event, it
is then possible to identify the recurring ones for a type of
event (flood, earthquake, nuclear or industrial accidents)
or for all the disasters. Among the attempts to draw
up human behaviour typologies which aim to apply to
all disasters, that proposed by Mawson (2005) should be
noted.The latter is based on two axes : perceived degree
of physical danger, location of attachment figures. But
it does not take into account the diversity and change of
human behavior according to the dynamics of the event.
This typology is not really adapted to our ultimate aim
which is to model and simulate human behaviour in spa-
tial and temporal dimensions. That is why, to capture
the diversity of behaviours, we adopt an approach based
on empirical analysis of different types of disasters.
The originality of this research is to draw up a general
typology of human behaviour, not according to the origin
of the event (natural hazard, technological or social) but
with respect to its temporality and the access to informa-
tion. This research identifies also the common properties
of human behaviours, wheter they are individual or col-
lective behaviours.
Individual and collective behaviours are widely anal-
ysed from a disciplinary standpoint (sociological, psycho-
logical, economical standpoints) or in terms of complex
systems. But collective behaviours are still underconsid-
ered in analysis of human behaviours. However, any dis-
aster creates collective behaviours in the sense that these
behaviours are triggered by the same situation and af-
fect the whole community, share common characteristics
which are in sharp contrasts to the disparity of individual
activities at the normal stage.
The complex systems and the notion of emergence (a
notion which refers to two levels of analysis, the indi-
vidual and the collective level and to the relationship
between these levels), seems to be a promising way to
identify and modeling the mechanisms underlying these
behaviours (Benkirane, 2002; Provitolo and Daude´, 2008;
Provitolo, 2009). The issue of emergent behaviours has
been rarely considered. This is why, here we review the
different points of view (those from risk sciences and those
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from complex systems) that will allow to identify a be-
haviour as emergent. The notion of emergence is open to
misinterpretation. For risk sciences the term is generally
understood in literary terms, in the sense of the sudden
appearance of something, or the arrival at the forefront
of a leader or an organization . On the other hand, in the
field of nonlinear dynamics and complex systems, emer-
gence makes sense only when adressing levels of organi-
zation (Mayet, 2005).
This paper is arranged into three parts. The first part
proposes a typology of behaviours observed at times of
catastrophe and identifies properties common to all such
behaviours. Parts two and three ask whether behaviours
observed at times of disaster or catastrophe (behaviours
that stand apart from everyday behaviours and that can
be observed both individually and collectively) can be
characterized as emergent behaviours. Answering this in-
volves weighing up inputs from the science of risk and
from complex systems. This knowledge of the conditions
underlying the emergence of behaviours points the way
to how the phenomenon might be modelled.
2 Diversity of human behaviour in
situations of crisis, disaster or
catastrophe
Several authors (Quarantelli 1995; Faulkner, 2001; Birk-
land, 2006) identified criteria for distinguishing disasters,
crises and catastrophes : according to the scale or magni-
tude of the event (the magnitude should be measured in
lives or property lost, or by the extent of the failure of the
normative or cultural system (Perry, 2006)), according
to the actions or inactions of an organization, according
to the assistance from regional and national governments
or from international or nongovernmental relief organiza-
tions, according to the damages, an event can be classified
in terms of crises, disasters or catastrophes. But these au-
thors do not specify which threshold or which combina-
tions of variables are used to qualify the event as a crisis,
disaster or catastrophe. Quarantelli (2005) identifies six
elements to capture the major differences between catas-
trophes and disasters. In a catastrophe :
- There is massive physical impact (in contrast to the lo-
calized impact in disasters).
- Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work
roles.
- Help will come mostly from more distant areas (such as
international help).
- Most everyday community functions are sharply and si-
multaneously interrupted.
- International media focus their attention on the event.
- Very high-level officals and governmental agencies from
the national level become directly involved in the man-
agement of the event.
As for the crisis, it is often defined as an event that
exerts heavy and destabilizing pressure on organizations,
whether formal organizations or spontaneous. The cri-
sis stakes the adaptive capacity of organizations. Al-
though these authors have distinguished the catastrophe
from the disaster and crisis, we use them interchange-
ably, because they ”connote both the idea of a disastrous
or catastrophic event, of a disruption, which may involve
an infinite variety of situations ” (Lepointe, 1991).
Human behaviour in crisis, disaster or catastrophe sit-
uations may be analysed over separate periods of time.
In this paper, we look at the behaviour of the popula-
tion before, during and immediately following disaster im-
pact. We try to find out how people react at these times,
what they do, and what decisions are made. We make no
value judgements of the behaviours and do not look to
say whether they are rational or irrational responses (as
measured against standard economic yardsticks).
We propose a typology of behaviours observed in the
course of various catastrophic events. The events selected
(industrial catastrophes of Toulouse (2001) and Bhopal
(1984), Three Mile Island nuclear accident (1979), earth-
quakes of Loma Prieta (1989), Northridge (1998) and
Haiti (2010), the string of catastrophes in Japan (2011),
mudslide of Vargas (1999), tsunami in Indonesia (2004),
volcanic eruption of Karthala (2006), hurricane Katrina
(2005), etc.) served as catalysts for observing (from sur-
vey data, texts, videos, etc.) how individuals and social
units (whether existing before the event or emergent) or-
ganize their response and adopt one or more types of be-
haviour. The observations pertained to natural and tech-
nological events or sequences of events in different parts
of the world so as to include the diversity of living stan-
dards and of cultures in the analysis of behaviour, even
if the role of culture is not the specific purpose of this
paper.
The typology of human behaviour (Fig. 1) based on
observation was drawn up not in terms of the origin of
the event but according to its time continuum and ac-
cess to information. To do this, we have 1) identified
(from various data sources) the diversity of behaviours
that may occur during a catastrophic event, 2) classified
these behaviours depending on the time continuum of the
event (time from upstream to downstream of the event)
and the information available to the public about the oc-
currence of a disaster (we take as axiomatic that access
to information changes the behaviours), 3) identified the
common properties to these behaviours, whether they are
individual behaviours or collective behaviours that spread
to the whole community (Noto et al., 1994).
Three time periods were distinguished: the phase be-
fore the disaster or catastrophe, the disaster/catastrophe
phase, and the impact phase. For each of the three di-
mensions, behaviours of distancing or on the contrary of
contact are observed. The pre-disaster phase, which as
the name indicates precedes the event, consists of three
sequences that are dependent on a system of surveillance
and alert:
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• When the threat is not announced, it is everyday
behaviours that are observed. These are very varied
and the travelling that may be associated with them,
is spatially very varied.
• When the threatening event is announced but is
not imminent, specific behaviours with respect to
the event are put in place progressively: sponta-
neous or organized evacuation behaviour is observed
(Three Mile Island, hurricane Katrina), behaviour to
counter the potential impact of the danger (e.g. rein-
forcing defences against tornadoes or flooding), con-
finement and taking shelter (e.g. going straight back
home) or on the contrary gathering close relatives
(e.g. collecting children from school). In relation
to spontaneous or organized evacuation behaviour,
when the potential impact zone is pretty much delin-
eated, a centre-periphery model is progressively put
in place. A part of the population leaves the area
and institutional emergency crews may move into the
area to try to improve security for the population.
• Conversely, when the event is imminent and a per-
sonal threat (e.g. danger from a cyclone is con-
firmed), other behaviours appear: forced or chosen
immobility, flight (in panic or reasoned), gathering
or mustering of individuals or groups, assistance and
emergency services interventions.
The disaster/catastrophe phase consists in a sequence
that we call ’foreseen or unforeseen present danger’: this
is a period (of varying length depending on the type of
event) of social and territorial disorganization where ev-
eryday behaviours give way to threat-specific behaviours.
Most travel is to ensure the protection and survival of
oneself or close relatives. Often travel is in groups, some-
times under the authority of a leader, sometimes by the
interplay of individual actions. Behaviours of distancing
from or coming into contact with the catastrophe are thus
observed: flight or fight against the effects of the disaster
(during the 1993 Mississippi floods, inhabitants stacked
sandbags hoping to keep back the floodwaters), forced
immobility (buried under a collapsed building) or cho-
sen immobility (refusal to evacuate), sideration (inability
to react), confinement or shelter (travel to get home or
get to shelter, etc.), collecting of close relatives (gener-
ally within a short radius) or rescue, curiosity (floods at
Draguignan in June 2010, France), grouping, assistance
and rescue, ensuring public safety. Such behaviours are
responses that are more or less adapted to the catastro-
phe and that change the population’s vulnerability or on
the contrary its resilience. Their respective importance
varies with the type of catastrophe, its space and time
dimensions, the alert arrangements, and the visualization
of the event.
The phase that follows the event or the impact phase
is marked by behaviours similar to those of the event
with, in addition, ’antisocial’ behaviour, to put a name
on looting and theft, etc. Such behaviour is often
confined to a minority but is widely reported by the
media. Motivations differ greatly between individuals
who have lost everything and are trying to survive the
event (looking for clothing, water and food) and looters
proper looking to get rich quick. On the scene of the
catastrophe, organizations emerge to rescue and ensure
the survival of individuals. The travel that progressively
takes place is closely guided by the centre-periphery
model. It intensifies to such an extent that the insti-
tutional emergency services very quickly look to set up
buffer zones to limit any movement towards the centre
other than for the emergency services. The buffer zone
is frequently set up within the marginal zone that forms
a transitional zone between the affected and unaffected
areas. It is also a zone where various rumours may arise
that the rescuers and authorities attempt to stifle by
their presence and by reactivity to stop them spreading.
From this typology of human behaviours, it is possi-
ble to identify three properties common to all of the be-
haviours observed and identified in the pre-catastrophe,
catastrophe and impact phases.
• Behaviours are essentially non traditional, they do
not correspond to daily behaviours. They generally
occur in a threatening environment where standard
methods of acting cannot be followed or are inap-
propriate. What characterizes them therefore is that
they are at odds with daily behaviour impelled by
varied motivations. Such behaviours include sidera-
tion, confinement, flight, evacuation, panic, deviant
behaviours, etc.
• Behaviours in a catastrophe period are not
specific to a level of analysis. They may be read
with respect to individuals, families, groups or or-
ganizations. Studying human behaviour therefore
requires us to look at (1) individual, isolated be-
haviour at odds with traditional behaviour, (2) pre-
established collective behaviour (role of collective ac-
tors, (3) individual behaviour spreading to the entire
group (collective panic). These levels lead us to in-
vestigate the concept of emergence.
• A short-lived behaviours: behaviours that are
limited in time with a return to daily behaviours.
Specific behaviours arise with the catastrophe and
disappear either with it or during the post-impact
phase.
These properties are also presented by some scholars (Ro-
driguez et al., 2006) as properties allowing emergent be-
haviour to be characterized.
With respect to the typology of behaviours we pro-
pose, the question is whether these behaviours that are at
odds with daily behaviours and that can be observed both
among individuals and collectively can be characterized
as emergent behaviour. To answer this we rely on the
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Figure 1: Typology of human behaviour
typologies of emergent behaviours and groups proposed
by thematics specialists, on the typology of emergence
proposed by J. Fromm (2004) (viewpoint of complex sys-
tems) and on its applicability to the analysis of human
behaviours. This knowledge of the conditions that un-
derlie the emergence of behaviours allows us to posit the
modalities for possible modelling.
3 Emergence of organizations and
behaviours: the viewpoint of
thematics specialists
Individual and collective behaviour is widely analysed
from a disciplinary standpoint (sociological, psychologi-
cal, economical standpoints) or in terms of complex sys-
tems. In sociology, the research initially gave priority
to the study of individual reactions in stressful situa-
tions (Wolfenstein, 1957), even if from the 1960s some
pioneering studies on individual and collective behaviour
exist (Beach and Lucas, 1960). Research on collective be-
haviour has also been developed in the field of economic
sociology or economics where the focus is on economic be-
haviour of individuals (Granovetter, 1978), in the field of
psychology with the pioneering work of G. Le Bon (2003),
for whom ”the crowd is a flock that can not do without
a leader”. But more recent research has shown that the
collective behaviour was not necessarily related to the ap-
pearence of a leader. For example, the collective panic
would thus emerge from the diffusion of individual panic,
without the attendance, the domination of a leader who
would call to the panic (Provitolo, 2005, 2009).
It very quickly appeared that there is no consensus as
to the definition of emergence. On this question of the
emergence of human and organizational behaviour spe-
cific to times of danger or disaster, thematics specialists
working in the analysis of behaviour often use the con-
cept of ’emergent behaviour’ and have proposed various
typologies for identifying them. This research has been
developed essentially by sociologists and especially by a
field of sociology dealing with ’collective behaviour’ (Ro-
driguez et al., 2006). This disciplinary field is more es-
pecially interested in the dynamics of social phenomena
such as crowd behaviour, looting, panic, revolutions, etc.
Some work (Disaster Research Center; Kreps, 1984,
2006; Quarantelli, 1994b; Tierney et al., 2001; Rodriguez
et al., 2006) has investigated the emergence of institu-
tionalized groups (routine patterns of action in existing
organizations, Weller and Quarantelli, 1973) or informal
collective behaviour for managing an event (crisis, disas-
ter, catastrophe).
The Disaster Research Center (DRC) proposed back in
1963 a typology of organized behaviours at the time of the
crisis period in disasters. This typology consists of a ma-
trix with four quadrants, with one of the two axes defin-
ing the Tasks (regular or non regular) and the other the
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Structure of the organization (old or new). From these
two axes, the Disaster Research Center distinguishes four
types of organized response, only one of which is consid-
ered emergent:
• Type I: Established responses (regular tasks and
old structures): this group exists before an event and
many of its actions are planned (hospitals, emergency
medical services, etc.).
• Type III: Extending responses (nonregular tasks
and old structures): this group exists before an event
but many of its actions are not predetermined (the
government agencies that aid in managing the re-
moval of debris and help in rebuilding operations, as
in Haiti, for example).
For types I and III, the organization exists before an event
and many of its actions are either planned (T. I) or not
predetermined (T.3).
• Type II: Expanding responses (regular tasks and
new structures): many of the actions are planned but
the basic structure of the organization shifts from
a small group of professionals to a larger group of
volunteers (Red Cross, National Guard, etc.).
• Type IV: Emergent responses (new tasks and new
structures): its existence and activities are ad hoc
and therefore unique to the event. These are small
or large groups that take shape and carry out tasks
or activities that institutionalized groups cannot ac-
complish. Thus the emergent organized response
(people sometimes speak of ’emergent groups’ too),
is related to the idea of non traditional and new be-
haviour (example of mutual assistance groups that
form just after a catastrophe to look for the in-
jured and help evacuate them). While the infor-
mal emergent groups are generally organized in the
period after the disaster and more rarely during
the event, during which period individuals orga-
nize their actions more around their families and
friends (Quarantelli, 1988), institutionalized groups,
whether emergent or not, act both during and after
the event.
Continuing this line of research, keeping as key vari-
ables the length of time the organization has existed and
its functions, and looking into the question of forms of
emergence, Quarantelli (1984, 1994b) distinguishes emer-
gent behaviour from emergent groups. This typology,
which applies to the time of crisis, identifies four types of
emergent behaviour and considers emergence of the group
as on of those types (Fig. 3). The originality of this ty-
pology is to reveal that in most of the organizations and
groups that were not emergent, there were nonetheless
considerable emergent phenomena (Tierney et al., 2001).
During a disaster, each of these types of emergence may
be present simultaneously.
Figure 2: Typology of organized responses established by
the Disaster Research Center
Figure 3: Four types of emergent behaviour
Quasi-emergent behaviour correspond to established
organizations (type I ’established groups’ of the DRC ty-
pology) that continue to perform their roles and missions
as often they do not undergo any major change in their
structures or functions. However, there may sporadically
be a change in actors so that the organization operates to
the full (this is referred to as temporary or minor emer-
gent behaviour).
Structural emergence corresponds to organizations
which, to continue to perform their old functions, develop
a new structure. Being unable to accomplish their mis-
sions, the organizations are then temporarily replaced by
individual actors (e.g. amateur radio operators provid-
ing a liaison with the Weather Service Office during the
New Orleans floods) (extending group by the DRC typol-
ogy). A temporary link-up or social network is thus put
in place.
Task emergence is what happens with organizations
whose structure is unchanged in any way but that take
on a new task. These, then, are organizations that take
on the roles of a defaulting organization. This category
replaces what the DRC calls an ’expanding organization’.
Lastly, emergent groups are characterized by both a
new structure and function (identical definition to the
DRC typology).
The typologies proposed by the DRC and Quarantelli
apply to behaviours that emerge within institutional or
informal organizations; but these typologies cannot read-
ily encompass the variety of behaviours that can be ob-
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served among individuals and which, because of the com-
binations of actions and interactions, engender emergent
collective behaviour (e.g. collective flight, spontaneous
gatherings).
Confronted with this observation, we wish to resituate
the analysis of emergent behaviour (as meant by themat-
ics specialists, that is, in the sense of non-traditional and
unexpected behaviour associated with the performance
of a task and the existence of a structure) in the more
theoretical context of identification of the properties of
emergence (in the sense of complex systems).
4 Human behaviours and organi-
zational responses with respect
to types of emergence
Emergence has many meanings within the complex sys-
tems. But all of the definitions proposed refer to the
connections between the constituents of a system, to re-
lations between the micro and macro levels, and to the
appearance of structures, properties or forms at macro-
scopic level. For some scholars (Bunge, 1977; Searle,
1995), these entities or structures described at macro level
cannot be reduced to the composition of individual prop-
erties at local level.
The purpose here is to analyse human behaviour and
organizational responses in situations of crisis, disaster or
catastrophe with respect to one of the emergence typolo-
gies used in the area of complex systems. This analysis
allows us to identify emergent behaviour from the proper-
ties of emergence and to combine perspectives and disci-
plines by expressing the multiple points of view, those of
thematics specialists and those of complex system model
makers.
We use the typology of J. Fromm (2004) who, for all
types of system, distinguishes four types of emergence
(simple, weak, multiple and strong) and dissociates uni-
lateral emergence (bottom-up but no top-down feedback)
from bilateral emergence (with top-down feedback).
4.1 Simple Emergence without top-down
feedback (Type I)
Type I describes unilateral emergence (Fig. 4), that is,
with no feedback loop between macro- and microscopic
levels. ’Unilateral emergence arises from the influence of
attributes alone, from relations between the microscopic
entities and the outside context’ (B. Walliser, 2005).
The phenomenon emerges at macroscopic level because
of combined actions or interactions between the con-
stituents at microscopic level. Fromm distinguishes (Ia)
simple intentional emergence from (Ib) simple uninten-
tional emergence. In type Ib, individuals are unaware of
the macroscopic phenomenon they are helping to create.
Figure 4: Simple emergence without top-down feedback
(adapted from Fromm, 2004)
However, if for type Ia agents are aware of the emerg-
ing structure, a specific and fixed role is assigned to each
part, and this role does not change in the course of time.
Type Ia reveals an absence of flexibility and adaptability,
because the roles are fixed and predictable. That means:
’A defect in a single component can bring the entire sys-
tem to a halt’. The established organization/organized
response (regular task and old structure, DRC type I)
corresponds to this type of emergence where individual
institutional actors take on specific and set roles and in-
teractions among those actors emerge from organized in-
tervention groups (hospital care services, emergency med-
ical services, etc.). However, this type of emergence is
rare in situations of crisis, disaster or catastrophe since
the actors are generally able to adapt and modify their
role so that the organization operates fully (this is known
as actor substitution). This is the idea proposed by Quar-
antelli with the typology entitled Quasi-Emergent Be-
haviour. For type Ib, the system components have no
specific role; emergence is said to be unintentional since
it results solely from the interplay of combined actions or
interactions among entities (microscopic level). If we refer
to the typology of behaviour proposed in part one (Fig.
1), the fight against the effects of the disaster (chain of
individuals interacting to fight flooding: e.g. the inhabi-
tants of Des Moines (Iowa) stacked thousand of sandbags
in the hope of damming the floodwaters of the Des Moines
river in 1993), or mutual assistance behaviours put in
place without a leader (as with mutual-help groups that
may form spontaneously just after a catastrophe through
a combination of individual actions to search for and help
evacuate the injured: DRC type IV, emergent organized
response) come under simple unintentional emergence.
However, because of the principle of non-compositionality
(in the sense that descriptions at macro level are not
a simple composition of individual properties at micro
level, Bunge, 1977), group behaviours such as flight are
not emergent behaviour (each individual behaviour is a
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flight and the group behaviour is simply the effect result-
ing from individual flight). There are therefore multiple
viewpoints: that of thematics specialists for whom group
behaviours are emergent when they break with everyday
behaviour, that of model makers of complex systems for
whom the concept of emergence can describe how a non-
compositional behaviour at macro level rests on a struc-
ture of interactions at micro level.
Beyond a critical point, in addition to local inter-
actions, the macroscopic level (e.g. mutual-assistance
groups fighting the effects of a disaster) has a feedback
effect on the micro level, which then requires such be-
haviour to be ranked in another category of emergence:
weak emergence with top-down feedback.
4.2 Weak Emergence including top-down
feedback -Type II-
Weak emergence (type II) (Fig. 5) includes bottom-
up (from micro to macro), top-down (from macro to mi-
cro) feedback and self-organizing processes. The roles of
agents or actors are flexible. This is the framework of bi-
lateral emergence since there is feedback action from the
macroscopic phenomenon to the microscopic level. This
bilateral emergence may be synchronic when the influ-
ences between levels are exerted instantaneously (e.g. ac-
tors co-ordinate their behaviours and an evacuation func-
tion emerges that vanishes as soon as the actors cease to
be co-ordinated) or diachronic when a macroscopic struc-
ture arises from the dynamic behaviour of systems. For
Fromm, top-down influences are exerted more slowly than
bottom-up influences. All individual behaviours observed
during catastrophic events (Fig. 1) may be included
in this category provided that from these individual be-
haviours there emerges a new structure at macro level (a
spontaneous mutual-assistance group – DRC type IV –,
an assembly dynamic, etc.), and the new structure pro-
vides feedback for the microscopic entities without these
entities having any representation of emergence. We call
this ’indirect’ or ’physical’ feedback in the sense that the
aggregate phenomenon exists only for an observer and
may cause or modify the conditions that constrain indi-
vidual behaviours (e.g. when a crowd grows, constraints
on movement increase and so reduce the choices as to
where to move; individual behaviour is then subjected to
the movement of the crowd) in contradistinction to the
concept of strong emergence which includes the idea of
representation (type IV of Fromm’s typology).
In the case of weak emergences, only the observer can
’observe, view’ from above (like an airline pilot) what
is going on: a common trajectory of population move-
ment towards a precise location, etc. Accordingly the
phenomenon can be read in two different ways: that of the
individual agent acting locally within his environment, or
that of the outside observer. Fromm distinguishes weak
stable emergence from weak instable emergence. In both
instances, bottom-up and top-down feedback loops come
Figure 5: Weak emergence including top-down feedback
(adapted from Fromm, 2004)
into play. For weak stable emergence, there is positive
feedback from micro to macro level and negative feed-
back from macro to micro level. This double feedback
loop regulates the system. However, for weak unstable
emergence, there is a double positive feedback loop since
the emergence of a new structure tends to reinforce the
phenomenon. The emergence of collective panic from in-
dividual panic in a crowd made up of panicking and non-
panicking individuals may fit in with ’unstable simple
emergence’ since instantaneous interactions among the
microscopic entities (the panicking and non-panicking in-
dividuals) spread to the entire crowd (macro level) which,
above a certain level of panicking population feeds back
onto all of the individuals reinforcing the panic behaviour
(process of propagation in space and time).
However, if the actor is aware of the emergent or emerg-
ing structure, behaviours no longer fit into the weak emer-
gence but into the strong emergence typology.
4.3 Multiple Emergence with many feed-
backs (Type III)
This type of emergence is based on the idea (1) that emer-
gent structures are often a combination of stable and un-
stable weak emergence and (2) that feedback occurs over
the short term (for positive feedback: e.g. when blindly
imitating your neighbours behaviour) and the long term
(for negative feedback: when adopting thoughtful be-
haviour, behaviour that is not the outcome of the pressure
of conditions that compel individual behaviours in a sim-
ple way type II), and (3) that, in addition to these two
properties, a form of emergence can be named ’adaptive
emergence’ for complex systems demonstrating adaptive
capacities (Fig. 6). Of course, all complex systems are
not adaptive, but all those involving living societies are.
In catastrophe situations, human behaviours are
modified in the short term as a function of the cognitive
factors and of the adaptive capacity of individuals (idea
of appearance of new roles and disappearance of old ones:
e.g. organizations that take on the roles of a defaulting
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organization cf. typology Task emergent behaviour).
This adaptive capacity changes over the long term with
experience and learning (long-term memory).
Figure 6: Multiple emergence with many feedbacks
(adapted from Fromm, 2004)
4.4 Strong Emergence (Type IV)
Strong emergence (Fig. 7) is bilateral emergence that
encompasses the idea of the intentionality and reflexivity
of actors (Mu¨ller, 2004; Walliser, 2005). The system
contains elements that are able to observe the collective
effects of their interaction and the representations they
derive from those observations influence their decisions
and behaviour (Mu¨ller, 2004). These actors are more
or less aware of the emergent phenomenon they tend to
produce and of the mechanism that leads to it, which
may modify the phenomenon itself (Walliser, 2005).
Many institutionalized behaviours and some collective
behaviours (hospital response in disasters) are the result
of interaction among actors’ individual actions. These
actors consciously participate in voluntarily constructing
organized groups with roles and missions that are
relatively clearly defined beforehand or during the
actor-substitution process. The actors are thus aware
of the emergent phenomenon but, unlike with simple
emergence, the roles and missions they must carry out
are flexible (Red Cross, emergency fire services, etc.).
Behaviours characterized as ’quasi emergent behaviour’,
’task emergent behaviour’ and ’structural emergent
behaviour’ may thus be classed in the strong emergence
type when the overall project is explicitly known by
individuals. However, spontaneous organizations (search
and rescue groups) that appear during the post-shock
phase may be part of this category of emergence if and
only if the individuals are aware of the emergence process
and of the organization that is being put in place. This
information can only be extracted by interviews after the
disaster or the catastrophe.
To conclude, in order to characterize emergence in all
its forms, two levels must be distinguished: a local level of
interacting individuals/entities and a global level. Emer-
gence occurs if the behaviour or the global structure can-
not be reduced to local behaviours or structures (Bunge,
Figure 7: Strong emergence (adapted from Fromm, 2004)
1977; Searle, 1995). We characterize emergence as weak
if the phenomenon as such does not have any feedback on
the local level. In this sense the global phenomenon exists
only for an outside observer. This global phenomenon
may, nonetheless, have no influence on the micro level
(type I of Fromm’s classification), it may cause or mod-
ify the conditions that constrain individual behaviours
in a simple way (type II of Fromm’s classification), or
it may be multiple (type III of Fromm’s classification).
Emergence is strong if the global phenomenon has feed-
back as such on the local level, which means local enti-
ties are ’aware’ of the global phenomenon. All of these
emergences are synchronic since the local level and global
level co-exist at all times simply because they are posited
by definition; such emergences are therefore necessarily
instantaneous or more specifically a-temporal. We have
also been able to see that any group of interacting enti-
ties engenders global behaviour (such as collective flight).
It is therefore possible to model the dynamics (the be-
haviour) of the group in the form of a dynamic system
whose trajectory in state space is to be observed. We
are then interested in the qualitative change of this be-
haviour. Three situations may be observed:
(1) there can be a move from non-emergent to emergent
behaviour (from collective flight to a structured evac-
uation behaviour, with roles as guides, etc.)
(2) there can be a move from one emergent behaviour to
another (from evacuation behaviour to establishing
a security perimeter)
(3) the emergent behaviour vanishes (collective flight re-
sumes or everyone goes back about their business)
Cases (1) and (2) are examples of diachronic emergence.
In case (1) emergence comes about, in case (2) there is
a shift from one form of emergence to another (change
of attractor). In case (3) where emergence disappears, it
may come about that the global level is no longer iden-
tifiable as such. There is therefore a combination of two
concepts of complex systems: (1) emergence, (2) the de-
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scription of dynamic systems and especially of their char-
acterization in terms of trajectories that make it possible
to describe attractors and around them bifurcations and
chaotic regimes. One is a-temporal and is a characteriza-
tion of a system at two levels of observation; the other is
temporal and describes trajectories.
5 Conclusion and directions for
further research
In this paper, we have proposed a typology of behaviours
observed during different catastrophic events, whether
natural or technological in origin, and whether local or
dispersed. We have constructed this typology not in ac-
cordance with the origin of the event but with respect to a
time continuum: the pre-catastrophe phase, the catastro-
phe phase, and the impact phase. For these three dimen-
sions, we have identified a variety of behaviours, some
corresponding to distancing from the event, others on
the contrary corresponding to coming into contact with
it. We have also identified three properties common to
all these behaviours: they are essentially non-traditional,
they are not specific to a level of analysis (behaviours
may take shape for individuals, families, groups or orga-
nizations), they are short-lived. These properties are also
presented by certain scholars and by risk and catastro-
phe thematics specialists as properties for characterizing
emergent behaviour. Now, in the field of complex sys-
tems, to characterize emergence in all its forms, two levels
must be distinguished: a local level of interacting individ-
uals/entities and a global level. In the absence of an iden-
tifiable global level, there is no emergence, which is there-
fore contrary to observations reported by pioneer field re-
searchers: during the crisis period of disasters, there was
a great deal of emergent behavior, both at the individual
and group levels. The emergent quality took the form of
nontraditional or new behaviour, different from routine
or customary norm-guided actions.
We have therefore presented the different properties for
characterizing emergent human behaviour, in order to re-
combine the disciplinary approach of scientific commu-
nities, both those conducting research in the domain of
crises and disasters and those developing their research
in the domain of complex systems. This first exercise has
therefore enabled us to bring together approaches and dis-
ciplines and to express the multiple viewpoints. It could
be useful subsequently for modelling whereby thematics
specialists and model makers can account for emergent
human behaviour in situations of crisis, disaster or catas-
trophe.
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